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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHEN BIAS IS BIPARTISAN: TEACHING ABOUT THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
REPUBLIC

ANN BARTOW*

INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property law courses offer law professors the opportunity to
teach a subject area rich with complicated statutory and court-made doctrines
about which students do not usually have strong or extensively delineated
moral views.1 It also gives everyone in the classroom a refreshing break from
the traditional partisanship of political party politics. Identification as a
Democrat or Republican does not provide too much guidance or create too
many expectations about a person’s views of intellectual property issues,
freeing classroom debates from the constrictions that political loyalties impose
in so many other contexts.2

* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. This Article is
dedicated to my students, past, present, and future, and to my son Casey.
1. See Kate Douglas Torrey, Downloads, Copyright, and the Moral Responsibility of
Universities, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 15, 2007, at 16; Katie Dean, Copyright Crusaders Hit
Schools, WIRED, Aug. 13, 2004, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/08/
64543; Library of Congress, Taking the Mystery Out of Copyright, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/
copyrightmystery/# (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
2. But see Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, The Effect of Judicial Ideology in
Intellectual Property Cases, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=997963. This is an interesting paper that makes a number of provocative but sometimes
poorly supported assertions about the relationship between ideology and judicial decision-making
in the context of intellectual property. To take just a couple of examples: at page nine, the article
asserts that “[t]hose in the IP trenches appear to regard judges as either impartial or indifferent on
questions of IP.” Id. This is supported only by a footnote that merely credits Kenneth Starr, who
is hardly fairly described as “in the IP trenches,” with observing that the Supreme Court is
professional and “very lawyerly.” Id.
At page twenty, the authors make the startling claim that “in the recent Grokster case, it
was fairly clear that all of the justices considered that allowing the providers of file sharing
services to blatantly encourage unlawful copying would be an extreme result.” Id. I interpret the
Breyer concurrence, joined by Stevens and O’Connor, somewhat differently. Certainly Breyer
acknowledged the possibility of liability for technology distributors for active advancement of
infringement by third parties. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 962–63 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). However, this did not, in my view, mean that “the
715

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

716

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:715

I. BIAS AND BARRIER HEIGHT
Some of the fiercest policy debates in academic intellectual property law
are over the proper level of monopolistic protection the legal system should
provide for copyrights, patents, and trademarks.3 They are often rhetorically
framed as arguments about how high the barriers should be that the law
constructs around specific copyrighted works, patented inventions, and
trademarks.4 Low barriers constitute low levels of protection, while high
barriers metaphorically fence out competitors more effectively and
dramatically. Therefore, one way to approach the theoretical underpinnings of
intellectual property law is as a series of questions about where the barriers
should reach, and why. Almost every law student can, where necessary, be
moved out of an “all copying is evil” mindset sufficiently to participate.5 This
can be accomplished by reminding students that they have used block quotes
taken from copyrighted works in their academic papers; have picked out

Court held unanimously that the defendants were liable for inducing infringement,” as the
article’s authors assert. Sag et al., supra.
3. For efficiency purposes I will categorize trademarks as a form of intellectual property for
the purposes of this Article, even though I believe that they are more accurately described as
intangible commercial property, given that congressional power to regulate trademarks stems
from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. It is the so-called “Intellectual Property
Clause” of the U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8, that provides the authority for Congress to regulate
copyrights and patents.
4. E.g., Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological
Contracts, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND COPYRIGHT 180 (Francois Leveque & Howard
Shelanski, eds., 2005); Megan Ristau Baca, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property
Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2006); Eugenia
Baroncelli et al., Trademark Protection or Protectionism?, 15 REV. INT’L ECON. 126 (2007);
Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to
Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623 (2005);
Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988);
David Mann, Copyright—Preventing a Safeguard From Becoming a Barrier, Address Before the
Conference on the Use of Telematics in the Education of Visually Handicapped People, June 2,
1998, http://www.snv.jussieu.fr/inova/publi/ntevh/copyright.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008);
Wanda Noel & Robert Schad, Copyright: Enabler or Barrier to the Educational Use of the
Internet, May 2002, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/98771/Policy%20Makers%
20workshop/policymakers/docs/pol_mod10_doc1.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Nick Smith,
Copyright as a Barrier to the Freedom of Access to Information and Freedom of Expression,
Address Before the 66th IFLA Council and General Conference, Aug. 15, 2000,
http://www.ifla.org/faife/papers/ps00/smith00.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Peter Suber,
Removing the Barriers to Research: An Introduction to Open Access for Librarians, Jan. 21,
2003, http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/acrl.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
5. Presumably students who do not believe in copyright protections at all could be engaged
as well, but I have yet to encounter any in my classes. But see Posting of David Pogue to N.Y.
Times Technology Blog, The Generational Divide in Copyright Morality,
http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/the-generational-divide-in-copyright-morality/ (Dec.
20, 2007, 13:30).
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copyrighted tunes on musical instruments and spontaneously sung “Happy
Birthday”;6 have read or listened to copyrighted poems at graduations,
weddings and funerals; have said “kitty litter” when they meant “cat box filler”
and have talked about “xeroxing” when the photocopier at issue was a Cannon;
or have moved a swing from side to side on the playground.7
Intellectual property law classes are tremendously fun to teach, and to
some extent they provide a respite from pedagogical burdens other subject
areas impose. At a religious school, for example, even when infusing
godliness into the curriculum is a stated goal of the institution, the intellectual
property law teacher is probably excused from espousing (for example) the
Christian views of trademark, patent, or copyright law, whatever they may be.
While it certainly isn’t the case that intellectual property laws are outside the
purview of social justice concerns,8 those they raise are generally less
potentially cataclysmic to clients than a failed death penalty appeal, a badly
flawed child custody decision, or an unsuccessful bankruptcy reorganization
that leads to homelessness and financial ruin.
For many practitioners, intellectual property constructs need to be
temporary, and pragmatism triumphs over dogmatism.
Views about
intellectual property rights need to be tenuously situated, because in a very
immediate way, today’s plaintiff can be tomorrow’s defendant. The writer
who sues to prove that another’s novel too closely parallels her own can find
herself accused of copying from someone else with respect to the very same
work of fiction. In consequence, parties to intellectual property litigation will
strategically deploy “principles” that are couched in the rhetoric of ethics and
morality, but repeat players are unlikely to do so consistently. For example,
the defendant asserting the importance of placing First Amendment-based
expressive freedoms over copyright concerns9 and arguing for a postmodern
approach to authorship10 today may well be arguing that unauthorized literal
copying cannot constitute fair use11 tomorrow, or possibly even
contemporaneously. For reasons including, but not limited to, potential

6. Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mikkelson, Happy Birthday, We’ll Sue,
http://www.snopes.com/music/songs/birthday.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
7. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000); Jeff Hecht, Boy Takes Swing at US
Patents, NEWSCIENTIST, Apr. 17, 2002, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2178.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).
8. See Symposium, Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559
(2007).
9. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891
(2002).
10. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1164 (2007).
11. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 1 (2000).
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conflicts of interest, employment lawyers typically represent only labor, or
only management, and personal injury lawyers stick to either plaintiffs’
representation or torts defense work. Intellectual property lawyers, however,
can do either, in an atmosphere of far less polarity, but with consequentially
diminished doctrinal coherence when assessed holistically across clients and
careers.12
Intellectual property law disputes are primarily about money and legal
control mechanisms over creative or inventive works that facilitate the
accumulation of money, or fail to. Many of the effective teaching cases
provoke debates about freedom of speech, property rights, and marketplace
competition issues. At a theoretical level, the law is supposed to calibrate
intellectual property rights using a balancing approach. Inventors and creators
are supposed to receive enough monopoly control over their works to reward
them for doing something new and useful, and to incentivize future efforts, but
no more than that.13 The myriad ambiguities concerning the scope of
intellectual property rights constitute a sort of Full Employment Act for
intellectual property lawyers.
In my experience, few students come to intellectual property law classes
with deeply entrenched views about the doctrines they will learn. If you teach
abortion rights cases in a required Constitutional Law class, you can
reasonably expect that most of the students who previously expressed liberalleaning views on other topics to support abortion rights, and most of the
conservative students to oppose abortion rights. Abortion is a controversial
topic, about which many people hold passionate views that they will express
with great emotion. If you are one of those law professors who believes that
your job is to lead the students to some neutral Truth, you are especially likely
to encounter a lot of resistance on this topic from students whose truth is
different than yours.14 You may not notice it while teaching, as some of the
students with acute emotional investments in one side of a debate may decline
to participate in classroom conversations in any way other than rote attempts to
give the professor whatever answer she probably wants, so that she will move
on. But you will surely read allegations about your biases and perceived
unfairness in your student-authored teaching evaluations. The usual absence of
a rigid pre-existing set of moral imperatives freighting policy conversations is
very liberating for the typical law professor, especially those of us who have

12. See Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13 (2003).
13. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928–29 (2005).
14. See Ann Bartow, Still Not Behaving Like Gentlemen, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 809, 841–42
(2001).
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strong political beliefs that are very different from those typically held by our
students.
II. THE APOLITICAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE
CLASSROOM
Another of the many interesting things about intellectual property law is
that the political schisms within the field are not along traditional party lines.
Neither the Democratic nor Republican parties have fixed or coherent platform
positions on intellectual property that reflect overarching party policies.
Unlike an issue like abortion, where comparisons of national party platforms
reflect deep partisan schisms,15 intellectual property laws offer opportunities to
study and teach about political divisions that obfuscate and sometimes
transcend traditional party-based political divisions.
Whether one political party is more in favor of high barriers intellectual
property protections than the other poses an interesting but probably
unanswerable series of questions. Republicans are sometimes seen as being
more “pro-property owner rights” than Democrats. However, Democrats are
often viewed as being more supportive of government regulation than
Republicans are, and intellectual property can’t even exist, no less be protected
for the benefit of its owners, without substantial amounts of government
regulation and intervention in the marketplace.
Is one party more in favor of low barriers intellectual property
protections?16 The idea that people should have unfettered access to
intellectual property for at least some purposes without compensating or
obtaining permission from the intellectual property holder as a matter of public
interest is a liberal one, and certainly liberalism is associated with the
Democratic Party. On the other hand, the “information wants to be free” ethos
that favors individual freedom to access, process, and repurpose information
has a decidedly libertarian aspect. Libertarianism is generally in tension with
liberalism, and associated with a mindset that rejects interventionism by
governmental actors into commercial transactions.
A.

Copyright Law

Copyright law offers one paradigmatic view of the power of constituent
interests. The Democratic Party receives a substantial amount of financial

15. Compare The Democratic Party, The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America:
Strong at Home, Respected in the World, at 42 (2004), http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/
2004platform.pdf, with The Republican Party, 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World
and a More Hopeful America, at 84 (2004), http://www.gop.com/images/2004platform.pdf.
16. Sag et al., supra note 2, astutely note, at page 10, “. . . judicial policy preferences
regarding IP do not fit within the stereotypical view of the liberal-conservative ideological
continuum.”
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support from many sectors of the entertainment industry, members of which
have often received copyright legislation that favors their interests.17 Many
Democratic politicians have promulgated extremely “high barrier” approaches
to copyright law, notably including former President Bill Clinton, who
appointed Bruce Lehman to the position of Assistant Secretary of Commerce
and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.18 Lehman oversaw the drafting
of the infamous White Paper,19 which prompted strong criticism from some
intellectual property law scholars,20 who sometimes got accused of bias
themselves.21
Republicans are unpopular with some sectors of the entertainment industry
because non-libertarian Republican politicians are perceived to be more in
favor of content-based content regulation, and sometimes even censorship,
than Democrats (though there are certainly exceptions, such as Tipper Gore,
who was involved with efforts by the Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC)
to convince the music industry to develop guidelines and/or a ratings system

17. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 903 (1987); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907,
908–09 (2004). But see Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 433 (2007).
18. NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: J. Hearing on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 33–39 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office) (1995); see
also Jonathan Tasini, Who is Bruce Lehman? Czar of the Information Superhighway Serves
Multi-national Media Interests, http://www.nwu.org/nwu/index.php?cmd=showPrinter&page_
id=1.2.13.2.15 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
19. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/doc/ipnii/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
20. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the
Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 105–06 (1997); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 558 (2004);
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 135; Pamela Samuelson, On
Authors’ Rights in Cyberspace: Questioning the Need for New International Rules on Authors’
Rights in Cyberspace, FIRST MONDAY, 1996, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue4/
samuelson/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Carl Tashian, Copyright in the Digital Age,
http://tashian.com/carl/docs/copyright/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); see generally COMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (National Academy Press 1999).
21. Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
61 (2002); Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Formation of
Legal Norms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155 (2003); Dante G. Ditommaso et al., The National
Information Infrastructure and Copyright Law: The White Paper, Pamela Samuelson, and
Proposed Revisions (Apr. 25, 1996), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~dditomm/cr_final_
project.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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similar to the Motion Picture Association of America’s film ratings system).22
The country music establishment, however, is predominantly Republican,
according to some observers.23
Tracking the behavior of Congress belies a party-based divide on copyright
policy. The House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary has a
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property.24 The current
chair of this Subcommittee is Howard Berman, a Democratic Representative
from California.25 He took over from Howard Coble, a Republican from North
Carolina,26 when control of the House switched from Republican to
Democratic in 2006.27 Though hailing from different coasts and different
parties, Berman and Coble hold views of intellectual property in close enough
alignment that in 2002 they introduced the “Berman-Coble Bill,”28 to “free the
marketplace to develop technologies that thwart P2P [peer-to-peer] piracy
without impairing P2P networks themselves . . . . by allowing copyright
owners, in certain limited circumstances, to use technological tools to thwart
P2P piracy without fear of liability.”29 As with the initiative’s supporters,
opponents of the bill came from both sides of the aisle, and from interested
parties across the political spectrum.30
22. Michael A. Coletti, First Amendment Implications of Rock Lyric Censorship, 14 PEPP. L.
REV. 421, 422–23 (1987); Gary James, Gary James’ Interview with Tipper Gore,
http://www.classicbands.com/TipperGoreInterview.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
The
PMRC’s lobbying convinced nineteen record companies to agree to put “Parental Guidance:
Explicit Lyrics” labels on albums to warn of explicit lyrical content. See Coletti, supra, at 424 &
n.9; Record Labeling: Hearing on Contents of Music and the Lyrics of Records Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong. 12–13 (1985).
23. David J. Firestein, The Honky Tonk Gap: Country Music, Red State Identity, and the
Election of 2004, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/webcasts/docs/honkytonkgap.pdf (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008); Victims of a Republican Plot: The Dixie Chicks Cross the Road,
COUNTERPUNCH, May 17, 2003, http://www.counterpunch.org/dixie05172003.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2008).
24. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property, http://judiciary.house.gov/committeestructure.aspx?
committee=3 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
25. Congressman Howard Berman: About Howard, http://www.house.gov/berman/about/
index.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
26. U.S. Congressman Howard Coble: Biography, http://coble.house.gov/biography/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).
27. Democrats Win Control of Congress, PBS.ORG, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/updates/politics/july-dec06/dem-house_11-07.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
28. H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002).
29. Press Release, Berman Introduces Legislation to Foil Peer to Peer Piracy (July 25, 2002),
available at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/berman.coble.p2p.statement.072502.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).
30. Declan McCullagh, Lawmakers: Keep Your Tunes to Yourself, C|NET NEWS.COM, Aug.
16, 2002, http://www.news.com/2100-1023-943134.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Hal Plotkin,
Berman-Coble Goes Too Far, SFGATE.COM, Sep. 12, 2002, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
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Rather than party politics, the copyright-related activities of congress
members appears to be influenced primarily by the interests of their
constituents. Senior Google attorney Bill Patry has argued that Berman’s
views about copyright law in particular are driven by the expressed desires of
his constituents, writing: “Mr. Berman is unabashed that his constituents have
a great interest in copyright and that he sees his role as protecting their
interests. That is, of course, why the public elects members of Congress: to
further their interests. Mr. Berman is doing what his constituents expect, and
rightly so.”31 To follow this argument to one possible logical extension, the
politics of intellectual property reflect a democratic process that functions
correctly in the sense that positions are formulated by interested parties rather
than political parties. Whether Patry’s view is correct on the merits is a subject
for another day. He is almost certainly right that Berman’s actions were
motivated by goals and interests outside of those that were articulated within
the four corners of the 2004 Democratic National Platform.32
Twenty years ago, after exhaustively researching the multi-decade
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, Jessica Litman wrote:
Members of Congress revised the copyright law by encouraging negotiations
between interests affected by copyright, by trusting those negotiations to
produce substantive compromises, and by ultimately enacting those
compromises into law.
This process yielded a statute far more favorable to copyright proprietors
than its predecessor, containing structural barriers to impede future
generations’ exploitation of copyrighted works. The legislative process may
have struck an unwise balance, but it, nonetheless, is a balance that members
of Congress and myriad industry representatives worked many years to
achieve. It is also a balance around which the represented industries have
33
since structured their relationships.

Because so much of the tussling over the ultimate formation of the Act was
delegated to interest groups, both political parties were arguably able to stay
more removed from the debates than would otherwise be expected in a process
that was so long and contentious. Congress also leaves a lot of copyright
lawmaking to the federal courts. As with members of Congress, labels like

bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2002/09/12/p2pleg.DTL (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Posting of
Ed Cone to EdCone.com, http://radio.weblogs.com/0107946/2002/09/27.html (Sept. 27, 2007,
4:59:41PM).
31. Posting of William Patry to the Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/
2007/06/larry-lessig-corruption-and-corruption.html (June 21, 2007, 5:35 AM).
32. See generally Democratic National Convention Committee, Strong at Home, Respected
in the World: The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America (2004), available at
http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
33. Litman, supra note 17, at 903.
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“liberal” or “conservative” that are often appended to judges have a lot less
meaning in the context of intellectual property law than they do in other legal
subject areas.
To illustrate with a personal observation: in the ordinary course of events I
tend to emphatically agree with many of the votes and written opinions,
concurrences and dissents, of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She’s “my
Justice,” the only woman currently on the Court, and the only woman who
seemed to consistently represent women’s interests even when Sandra Day
O’Connor was her colleague. I find it painfully ironic that the one area in
which I most fiercely disagree with her jurisprudence is one of my primary
scholarly areas, copyright law. Though I think she is both wonderful and
brilliant, I also think she was egregiously wrong in her Eldred v. Ashcroft
opinion.34 I won’t go into the specifics of why here, but when I harshly
criticize her conclusions in this case, it’s hard for my students to fairly accuse
me of having a pervasive “liberal bias” on intellectual property issues.
The two dissenters in Eldred v. Ashcroft were Justices Stevens and
Breyer.35 Though appointed to the Court by a Republican president, Justice
Stevens has recently been called “arguably [the] most liberal justice,”36 and his
jurisprudential writings on a wide range of topics such as abortion,37 school
desegregation,38 and the death penalty39 substantially parallel my own views.40
While in my opinion he got Eldred right, I can’t say the same for his majority
vote in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.,41 which is
one of the worst copyright decisions ever, due to its incredibly constricted view
of fair use. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the majority held that “The
Nation’s quotation of 300 words from the unpublished 200,000-word
manuscript of President Gerald R. Ford infringed the copyright in that
manuscript, even though the quotations related to a historical event of
undoubted significance—the resignation and pardon of President Richard M.
Nixon.”42 This, he noted, constituted an “exceedingly narrow approach to fair
use” that “permit[ted] Harper & Row to monopolize information,” effecting

34. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
35. Id. at 222–43 (Stephens, J., dissenting), 243–69 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007 at 50, 52.
37. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
38. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
39. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Justice: ‘Serious Flaws’ in Death
Penalty, CNN.COM, Aug. 7, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/08/07/death.penalty/
index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
40. E.g., Posting of Ann Bartow to Comment is free . . ., The Wrong Choice,
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ann_bartow/ (April 19, 2007, 7:00 PM).
41. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
42. Id. at 579.
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“an important extension of property rights and a corresponding curtailment in
the free use of knowledge and of ideas.”43
One inveterately left-leaning Justice who declined to sign onto Justice
O’Connor’s fair use and First Amendment-endangering opinion in Harper &
Row was Justice Thurgood Marshall. Not unexpectedly, Marshall joined
Brennan’s dissent in this case.44 Because these two Justices voted together so
often, I have law professor friends who sometimes jokingly refer to them as
“Justice Marshallbrennan” or “Justice Brennanmarshall,” as if they were a
single person. Though they didn’t always agree, they voted the same way far
more often than not.45
My son’s middle name is “Brennan” in honor of Justice Brennan, but if life
had given me the opportunity to bestow a moniker upon a second boy, his
middle name would have been Marshall, so profoundly do I similarly respect
Marshall’s judicial legacy.46 So it is with some consternation that I note that a
mere year before Harper & Row was decided, in arguably the most important
copyright case of the twentieth century, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios, Inc.,47 while Brennan joined Stevens’s convoluted and confusingly
written but doctrinally correct majority opinion,48 Marshall was one of four
spirited and deeply incorrect dissenters.49 When Marshall and Brennan split on
an issue, it’s clear that the politics of an issue are not along traditional divides.
In 1989, Marshall wrote an excellently reasoned opinion for a unanimous
Court in yet another copyright case, Community for Creative Non-Violence v.

43. Id. at 605.
44. See id. at 579–605 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch
Conservative? 52 J. POL. 530, 537, 538 (1990); C. Jeddy LeVar, The Nixon Court: A Study of
Leadership, 30 W. POL. Q. 484, 487 (1977); Laughlin McDonald, Uneasy Victories in the
Supreme Court, 8 S. CHANGES 15, 16–17 (1986); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Term:
Divisions Over Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1982 at A1, D14 (“The Justices who formed the most
indissoluble bloc were the Court’s two most liberal members, Associate Justices William J.
Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall. They voted alike in 132 cases out of the 141 in which both
participated.”).
46. The only reason Brennan was chosen before Marshall was in deference to the fact that
Marshall himself honored Justice William J. Brennan by naming one of his sons John William
Marshall. Juan Williams, Marshall’s Law, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 7, 1989, at 11, 15. “William”
is a very common name, and therefore not particularly distinctive, unlike Thurgood which is
uncommon enough that it might lead to childhood teasing, but possibly less so than Marshall’s
original first name, which was Thoroughgood. Id. at 15.
47. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
48. See id.; Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 101, 113–16 (2003).
49. Sony, 464 U.S. at 457–500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Reid,50 illustrating once again the unpredictability of judicial reaction to
copyright law issues.
B.

Patent Law

Interpreting patents too narrowly inadequately rewards a patentee and may
discourage future innovation. Designating too broad a scope for patent
monopolies, however, may over-reward relatively insignificant innovation,
fence competitors out of productive, potentially lucrative terrain, and dissuade
other inventors from conducting research in a particular area. As described
above in the context of copyright law, government actors will necessarily
formulate rough ideas about the appropriate balance between protecting patent
holders’ rights and upholding the freedom to compete, which can also lead to
rapid and productive innovation.
Different legislators, judges, and
administrative functionaries may have a wide range of opinions about how
strong patent monopolies should be, but as with copyright law, it is sometimes
hard to consistently situate their foundations within the traditional political
framework. Though they may ground their theoretical positions very
differently, both self-defined liberals and self-defined conservatives appreciate
the importance of scientific innovation as a general matter, and understand the
complexities of fostering it. Very few questions in patent law offer stark value
laden judgment calls evocative of the stark positive or negative reactions that
issues like the death penalty evoke.
Circuit splits are always jurisprudentially difficult, because they create
strong incentives for forum shopping and undermine precepts of fairness and
consistency in the way laws are applied. They were especially problematic in
patent cases, when it was possible that identical patent claims could be held
valid in some jurisdictions, but deemed invalid in others. The decision to
address this by creating a new, subject area-based appellate court was
essentially bipartisan.
Democrats were in control of the House of
Representatives, but Republicans controlled the Senate51 and the Executive
Branch when the Federal Circuit Act of 1982 authorized establishment of the
Federal Circuit, a unitary, specialized court to hear appeals of patent cases
from all of the federal district courts in the nation.52 It was brought to fruition
under Republican President Ronald Reagan, even though it had been an
initiative favored and driven forward by Democratic President Jimmy Carter.53

50. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
51. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Split Party Control of Congress, 1981–86: Exploring Electoral
and Apportionment Explanations, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 653, 653 (1989).
52. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (jurisdictional provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(2000)).
53. Federal Judicial History: Federal Circuit Act of 1982, http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/22a_bdy (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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The atypical political dynamism of patent law was more recently in
evidence in a press release touting the introduction of “Bicameral, Bipartisan
Patent Reform Legislation” and noting:
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), and Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a senior member of the panel, joined with Rep. Howard
Berman (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property and Rep.
Lamar Smith (R-Texas), ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee,
54
to introduce the Patent Reform Act of 2007.

Certainly there are traditional political divides that surface in patent law
jurisprudence. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, mostly “conservative bloc”
justices were in the majority (Burger, who wrote the opinion, and Stewart,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens), while traditionally liberal Brennan
dissented furiously over the issue of whether living things should be
patentable, and was joined by Marshall, White, and Powell.55 Ironically, the
conservative-dominated majority took an expansive and arguably liberal (in at
least some senses of the word) view of the Patent Act’s definition of patentable
subject matter,56 while the (mostly) liberal dissenters argued against reaching
an outcome that constituted activist judicial lawmaking in an area of acute
public interest.57 Both sides seemed to agree that Congress should step in and
show some leadership on a controversial issue that has still not been addressed
legislatively at the federal level in any expansive or coherent manner. One
way to characterize the fundamental conflict between the majority and
dissenting positions is as a disagreement over whether rendering living things
patentable or unpatentable was the appropriate default position until Congress
acted to clarify its views and intentions. Since that never happened, one can
alternatively conclude that the majority got the ultimate issue right (and in
consequence Congress hasn’t needed to step in), or that the dissenters were
correct that allowing the patenting of life through judicial action would defuse
pressure on Congress to act, allowing the body to evade its legitimate
lawmaking responsibilities in this contentious context.
Recent patent cases demonstrate the apolitical ethos of patent cases at the
Supreme Court level. Over the past fifteen years or so the Supreme Court
managed to vote unanimously in eight important patent law cases: Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc.,58 Markman v. Westview

54. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch, Berman, and Smith Introduce
Bicameral, Bipartisan Patent Reform Legislation (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200704/041807a.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
55. See 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
56. See id. at 307–18.
57. See id. at 318–21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
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Instruments, Inc.,59 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,60
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,61 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc.,62 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co,63 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC,64 and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Inc.65 This degree of doctrinal consensus is unusual, and probing the possible
policy reasons beneath it is an enjoyable pedagogical exercise.
During the same temporal interval there were also two cases that were
close to unanimous that serve to illustrate the unusual politics of patent law. In
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Justice Scalia wrote a majority opinion
that was joined by every Justice except his frequent comrade in many other
subject matter contexts, Justice Thomas.66 In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by everyone participating in
the decision save Justice Stevens, her regular compatriot in many other
doctrinal situations.67 I should point out that during this time period there were
also a couple of cases that seemed to fracture along traditional political lines,
but in one of them issues other than patent law were deeply implicated: Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank
was primarily a case about federalism.68
Teaching these Supreme Court cases allows me to spend significant
amounts of time outlining and explicating the tensions within the Federal
Circuit, and between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, and almost no
time debating the effects on patent jurisprudence of traditional political
divides. I think this is a refreshing break for the students, and it helps me reach
and be an effective teacher to students holding very different political views
than I do. Unlike my colleagues who teach courses with highly politicized
content, such as Constitutional Law, I am rarely negatively accused of “bias”
in my IP classroom teaching evaluations, even though I hold strong views
about intellectual property laws and discuss them openly.

59. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
60. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
61. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
62. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
63. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
64. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
65. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
66. See 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
67. See 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in this decision.
Id. at 1750.
68. See 237 U.S. 627 (1999).
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C. Trademark Law
Named for Representative Fritz G. Lanham (D-Tex.), the Lanham Act69
was passed on July 5, 1946 and signed into law by Democratic President Harry
Truman. Later that year the Republicans regained control of both the U.S.
Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, but the Lanham Act took effect in
1947, unimpeded by this shift. In more recent years, trademark holders have
been accorded enhanced rights and privileges in a number of ways, such as the
institution of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 198870 (authorizing intent to
use applications71), the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,72 and the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.73 Congressional opposition to
these changes has not been particularly fractious, nor was it noticeably divided
along party lines. Both political parties seem to have reached a rough
consensus that strengthening the powers and privileges of trademark holders is
beneficial for the nation. The challenge when teaching this area of the law is
to cogently articulate the negative impact that trademark laws can have upon
competition, and upon freedom of speech, to convince students that expansive
trademark rights can have negative consequences for industry actors, and for
consumers as well. The jurisprudence of Justice Scalia is helpful in this
regard, as I will describe below.
Trademark jurisprudence is remarkable for the lack of fact-finding and the
high degree of intuition that drives court rulings.74 Barton Beebe noted in a
recent empirical study of the multifactor tests for trademark infringement that
survey evidence is seldom proffered by parties to trademark disputes and rarely
credited by judges when it is.75 Trying to figure out what a judge was thinking
and unpacking the biases that might have been at play provides an excellent
opportunity to talk to students about the effects of bias in the courtroom and
techniques that an attorney might use to identify, defuse, or exploit them on
behalf of a client. As I noted previously, when describing the inconsistent
views in evidence in trademark case law
Articulated judicial perceptions about particular sorts of consumers
demonstrably vary, sometimes dramatically, even within similar factual
situations.
Wine consumers, for example, are viewed somewhat

69. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2000)).
70. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127
(2000)).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2000).
72. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000)).
73. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536, 1051A-545 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
74. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (2004).
75. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1641–42 (2006).
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schizophrenically by judges. In one case a district court found that “wine
drinkers tend to be older, wealthier, and better educated than the average
population.” However, a different district court in a different case concluded
that “the average American consumer is unlearned in the selection of wine.”
In so doing, it relied on a prior court’s opinion, which stated as follows: “[T]he
average American who drinks wine on occasion can hardly pass for a
connoisseur of wines.” This judge distinguished the determination by yet
another court that “the wine-buying public—insofar as their selection and
purchase of wine is concerned—is a highly discriminating group,” with the
somewhat snide, startling, and completely unsupported assertion that, “with all
due respect to Alabama, it would seem common knowledge that wine was not
76
a widely appreciated beverage in the South in 1959.”

After pointing out some of the strange asides in trademark cases in which a
judge seems to express contempt for the trademarked product, or one of the
parties, based on her or his own personal values, rather than any facts of a case,
students usually start noticing seeming non sequiturs for themselves. For some
of them, this is a transcendent moment, in which they get a meaningful
understanding of the importance to a client of both critical and creative
thinking, beyond simply knowing what a statute says, or being able to
reference a string of relevant holdings.
As with copyright law and patent law, reviewing the Supreme Court cases
on trademark topics allows me to avoid the pitfalls of traditional partisanship.
Teaching trademark law even gives me several opportunities to praise the
jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, something I do not ordinarily find
myself doing in other contexts, to put it lightly. Scalia, I can emphatically
explain to my students, did a commendable job in his majority opinion in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.77 untangling the disastrous mess that
a prior unanimous vote by the Court in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.78
had made of certain aspects of trademark law. Two Pesos is, in my view, the
worst trademark law opinion ever rendered by the Supreme Court. I say this
not merely because I disagree with the outcome, but because I think the
outcome reflects fundamental misunderstandings of trademark law. Although
I am hardly a “free marketeer,” allowing a company to assert broadly
construed trade dress protections in restaurant decor that are easily enforceable

76. Bartow, supra note 74, at 773.
77. 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
78. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Id. at
764. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 776. Justice Stevens and Justice Thomas
each filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Id. at 776, 785.
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via injunctive relief79 without bestowing any concurrent obligation to identify
what aspects of the decor it claimed as proprietary strikes me as egregiously
unfair and detrimental to legitimate competition. For reasons I will never
understand, the Court was unanimously persuaded otherwise. After lower
courts began to make the folly of the Court’s analysis in the case apparent,80 a
unanimous Court clarified important aspects of trade dress doctrine and vastly
undercut the reach of Two Pesos in Samara Brothers. While it was rather
alarming that not a single Justice objected to White’s abominable Two Pesos
reasoning, it was quite heartening to see the entire Court recognize and mostly
fix the problem together, as well. While I praise Scalia for his Samara
Brothers opinion, I am quite critical in my teaching of O’Connor’s opinion in
Park ‘n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly.81 Decided before Scalia joined the
Court, only one Justice, Stevens, found it objectionably problematic to
interpret a badly drafted provision of the Lanham Act such that high levels of
trademark protection were accorded to a phrase that probably never should

79. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (asserting ease with which injunctive relief can
often be obtained in intellectual property cases).
80. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439–40 (3d
Cir. 1994):
. . . [T]he Supreme Court in Two Pesos used “distinctive” in a dual sense, meaning either
inherently distinctive or having acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
Because the Supreme Court in Two Pesos did not decide the question whether trade dress,
and in particular trade dress in a product configuration, can actually ever be considered
inherently distinctive—for purposes of that case, the Court assumed that the restaurant
decor at issue was so—we must first embark on a journey to delineate when, if ever,
product configurations should be deemed inherently distinctive.
Id. (citations omitted).
See also Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995):
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Two Pesos . . . this circuit had held that trade
dress, unlike trademarks, could never be inherently distinctive, and thus we required
plaintiffs seeking § 43(a) protection of trade dress to establish distinctiveness by proving
that the trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. . . . In Two Pesos, however, the
Supreme Court rejected this circuit’s approach, finding no “textual basis in § 43(a) for
treating inherently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks differently from inherently
distinctive trade dress.”. . . . Plaintiffs in trade dress infringement cases, just as in
trademark cases, should be given a chance, the Court reasoned, to demonstrate that their
trade dress is “capable of identifying products or services as coming from a specific
source.”. . . . To deny such plaintiffs this opportunity until secondary meaning has been
established would impose “particular burdens on the start-up of small companies,” by
allowing competitors to appropriate the plaintiff’s dress in other markets and to deter the
plaintiff from expanding into and competing in these areas. . . .
The Two Pesos decision left this circuit with the task of determining what it means
for trade dress to be “inherently distinctive.”
Id. (citations omitted).
81. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
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have qualified for trademark registration in the first place. While O’Connor’s
opinion takes the arguably principled position that Congress rather than the
Court should fix the doctrinal quandary around “incontenstable” descriptive
marks that do not have secondary meaning, it’s strange and a bit jarring to note
that Brennan and Marshall signed on to this rather stark example of
jurisprudential conservatism. Only Stevens expressed the view that the Court
ought to step in and facilitate what Congress obviously meant to accomplish
with incontestability, rather than fixate on what it obtusely and irrationally said
in the Lanham Act.
III. CONCLUSION: “FOLLOW THE MONEY” AS PEDAGOGICAL IMPERATIVE
Does intellectual property legislation offer more opportunities for
bipartisan cooperation than other areas of law and policy? I’m not sure how
one might credibly attempt to measure this, but certainly political party based
polarization is less visible than it is in other congressional contexts. Industries
and interested parties are generally instrumentally invested in the barrier
heights of specific categories of intellectual property protections. Pointing this
out to students gives them a vivid and important understanding of the
legislative process. It also provides an interesting and possibly unique view of
the judicial decision making process and of statutory interpretation.
An alternative way to describe the overarching apolitical politics of
intellectual property law is with the aphorism “follow the money.” There are
many ways to demonstrate this in each intellectual property category. For
example, in copyright law one can pose queries such as: why did the
Recording Industry Association of America oppose peer-to-peer networks by
complaining that this kept artists from getting paid,82 while simultaneously
trying to get sound recordings added to the categories of works subject to
listing the Copyright Act’s definition for “work made for hire,”83 thereby
preventing artists from ever exercising termination interests, and in so doing,
getting paid? The answer can be ascertained by following the money, both
copyright-related revenue and campaign contributions, with a fair amount of

82. Gil Kaufman, RIAA Hits Seven Peer-to-Peer Services with Cease-and-Desist Letters,
MTV, Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1509720/20050916/index.jhtml?
headlines=true (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Piracy: Online and on the Street,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (“It’s commonly known as piracy, but it’s a too benign
term that doesn’t even begin to adequately describe the toll that music theft takes on the many
artists, songwriters, musicians, record label employees and others whose hard work and great
talent make music possible.”) (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
83. Eric Boehlert, Four Little Words, SALON.COM, Aug. 28, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/
ent/music/feature/2000/08/28/work_for_hire/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Brad King,
Rule Reversal: Blame it on RIAA, WIRED, Aug. 10, 2000, http://www.wired.com/politics/law/
news/2000/08/38129 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

732

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:715

criticism directed at one Democratic congressional representative, and
compliments for two others who helped undo the damage.84
While teaching patent law one can ask questions like: why would the
makers of medical devices patent medical procedures, knowing that the patents
cannot be enforced against doctors?85 Why would anyone patent something
they have no intention of commercially distributing, or purchase patents to
inventions that don’t appear to have any productive value? Usually, someone
has figured out how to use these patents to obtain money in a manner unrelated
to exploiting or licensing the claimed invention.86 Hypothesizing about where
the money is, and how someone else is attempting to appropriate it for herself,
can lead to some fairly sophisticated patent law policy discussions.
And finally, in a trademark law class one might raise questions along the
lines of: why would trademark holders ask judges for an injunction to prevent a
competitor from using a trademark in ways that is unlikely to cause confusion

84. Boehlert, supra note 83.
A key figure in the contributions part of the story is Rep. Howard Berman, D-Calif., the
ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property and a
longtime friend of the recording industry. Billboard reported that Berman took in five
times as much PAC and individual contributions from the entertainment industry as any
other member of Congress.
Among those who have written personal, $1,000 checks to Berman recently are Time
Warner lobbyist Timothy Boggs, Universal’s Morris, Seagram CEO Edgar Bronfman Jr.,
Vicki Iovine, the wife of Interscope Records chief Jimmy Iovine, Universal Music tech
guru Lawrence Kenswil and Universal Music Group COO Zach Horowitz.
The RIAA’s Rosen was another contributor.
Meanwhile, for the 2000 fundraising season, Berman remains the largest recipient of
music industry PAC money from the RIAA ($3,000), Time Warner ($7,000) and Seagram
($3,000).
As it turns out, Berman’s staff was among just two or three that knew about, and quietly
approved, the work-for-hire amendment last November. “Berman brought it in under his
hat,” charges attorney [Jay] Rosenthal. Berman declined to comment for this story.
According to Hill sources, when the initial controversy arose Berman privately defended
the amendment and told artists they were not going to get it repealed. But then some of
Berman’s Democratic colleagues, including Boucher and Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich.,
made it clear that if a repeal was not worked out they would introduce legislation of their
own to make it happen. “The train was leaving the station so he decided to get out front,”
says one observer.
Id.
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
86. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation From Actual Invention: A
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2 (2000); Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV.
199, 201 (2006); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils
of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent
Trolls? (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 980776, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980776 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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among reasonably prudent consumers? Or apply to register marks they have
no intention of using to any appreciable degree? Or claim Lanham Act-based
protections for product attributes that do not perform source identification
functions? Again it is mostly about money, and efforts to prevent competitors
from getting any, using any mechanism that trademark law provides.
None of this is meant to suggest that there aren’t scores of engaging social
justice issues that can be raised whilst teaching intellectual property law. It’s
simply that in addressing them one usually veers a classroom conversation
back into entrenched political divisions, and espousing a personal view can get
a professor tagged as a liberal or conservative, if not as a Democrat or
Republican. Advocating expansive fair use constructs for public libraries to
facilitate making books freely available for people who cannot afford their own
sounds like a liberal idea, as does suggesting that developing countries be
permitted, without sanction, to ignore the patents on pharmaceutical products
so that they can manufacture affordable lifesaving drugs for their own citizens,
and that social critics should be able to use a company’s trademarks to mock
and condemn its objectionable practices. I don’t think there is anything wrong
with taking an overtly political position in the classroom on occasion, but I do
appreciate the many opportunities that teaching intellectual property law
presents me to defy partisan grounded expectations when I do so.
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